Are Ukrainians ready for ceasefire and concessions? Here’s what the polls say

After three years of conflict, a majority of Ukrainians report being war-weary. Tetiana Dzhafarova/AFP via Getty Images.

A U.S.-Ukraine accord on a ceasefire proposal has put the notion of a negotiated end to the three-year war on the agenda, and in the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But even before Moscow responds, it’s pretty clear where the parties stand. Breaking a prior taboo against negotiations involving territorial concessions, the U.S. has suggested Ukraine must cede land in any permanent deal, whereas President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated repeatedly that he will never yield sovereignty over Ukraine’s territory.

Meanwhile, Russia has demanded that Ukraine renounce its aspiration to join NATO and accept restrictions on its military. But at present, Kyiv looks unlikely to gain the security guarantees it seeks from the U.S. before contemplating such terms.

What is talked about less is what the Ukrainian people are willing to accept for peace. And while any armistice will likely be dictated by guns, territorial gains and great power geopolitics, it will be in large part down to ordinary Ukrainians to shape what happens afterward. An ugly peace may be accepted by a war-weary population. But if it has little local legitimacy and acceptance, peace is likely to be unsustainable in the long run.

We have tracked public opinion in Ukraine from before the war and during the course of the conflict.

It is an imperfect exercise; most polling in wartime Ukraine is by mobile phone and depends upon those with service who are willing to participate. Many people, especially in the country’s south and east, do not want to answer sensitive questions out of concern for themselves and relatives, some in occupied territories and Russia.

Those who do respond may give guarded responses. Some are mindful of wartime censorship, while others are patriotic or wish to present themselves as such to the stranger calling them. Meanwhile, many other Ukrainians are overseas and excluded. Similarly, those in Russian-occupied territories are left out of surveys.

Nonetheless, the responses still give insights into how opinions in Ukraine have evolved since the Russian invasion of February 2022. Here are five important findings from relatively recent public opinion polls that are relevant to any forthcoming peace negotiations.

1. Nearly all Ukrainians are stressed and tired of war

Unsurprisingly, three years of a brutal war of aggression has created tremendous stress among a population increasingly weary of war.

A December 2024 poll from the respected Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, or KIIS found that nearly 9 in 10 Ukrainians experienced at least one stressful situation in the previous year. Large shares reported stressful experiences related to bombing and shelling (39%), separation from family members (30%), surviving the death of loves ones (26%) and the illness of loved ones (23%). Only 10% said they’d experienced no stressful situations.

In a related vein, surveys we have conducted showed that by summer 2024, 84% of the population had experienced violence in some form – be that physical injury at the hands of Russian forces, displacement, loss of family member and friends, or witnessing attacks.

And consistent with a growing number of news reports, we found that Ukrainians were deeply worried about war weariness among their fellow Ukrainians – just 10% reported that they did not worry about war fatigue at all.

2. More Ukrainians want negotiations, but there are red lines

As the war has gone on, several polls show that Ukrainians increasingly support negotiations. The share of the population in favor of negotiations varies depending on how the question is posed.

When given the choice between two options, a Gallup Poll from late 2024 showed that 52% preferred that “Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible,” whereas 38% preferred that “Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war.”

Our earlier surveys from 2022 and 2024 similarly show a growing preference for negotiations, though at a lower level – from 11% in 2022 to 31% in 2024. In contrast to the binary Gallup question, our surveys presented respondents with different territorial compromises for a ceasefire. While about one-third wanted an immediate ceasefire, half wanted to continue fighting until all territories, including the predominately Russian-speaking Donbas region and Crimea, are brought back under Kyiv’s control.

But survey responses make clear that the country’s political independence is a red line for the public – even if defending it comes at a very high cost.

3. Ukrainians are more open to territorial concessions

In tandem with growing support for negotiations, our surveys – in line with KIIS’s own polls – show growing willingness to cede territory. And among those most worried about war fatigue and more pessimistic about continued Western support, the willingness to cede territory is higher.

That said, most Ukrainians still want Ukraine to continue fighting until the country’s territorial integrity is restored and under Kyiv’s control, including Crimea. But that majority has diminished since the beginning of the war – from 71% in 2022 to 51% in 2024.

When we asked in July 2024 whether people agreed with the statement: “Russia should be allowed to control the territory it has occupied since 2022,” 90% disagreed. As such, there is very little evidence that Russia’s territorial annexations – or an agreement recognizing these, which is what Russia wants – will have any legitimacy among Ukraine’s population.

4. Ukrainians see Russia’s war goals in existential terms

Neither Zelenskyy nor most Ukrainians trust Putin – hence there’s a strong preference for any agreement being accompanied by security guarantees from NATO states.

Many Ukrainians share their leader’s distrust of Vladimir Putin.
Vladimir Novikov/AFP via Getty Images

Poll findings in the past month from KIIS reveal that 66% of Ukrainians interpret Russia’s war aims as an existential threat, comprising genocide against Ukrainians and destruction of its independent statehood. And 87% believe Russia will not stop at the territories it already occupies. Negotiating with an enemy bent on Ukraine’s destruction appears delusional to many Ukrainians.

5. Zelenskyy remains popular; his endorsement matters

As a defiant wartime leader, President Zelenskyy’s popularity was very high in the immediate months after the invasion. Indeed, KIIS polls from May 2022 show that 90% of the population expressed trust in him.

This has declined as the war has endured, but it has always remained above 50%. Recent polling measuring his approval puts it at 63%, an increase from 2024. Indeed, the very latest KIIS polls, from February through March of this year, show a 10-point jump in his trust rating to 67%, a finding widely viewed as rallying in the face of U.S. criticism.

Thus Zelenskyy’s endorsement of any ceasefire and settlement will matter, though ceding territory is likely to be hazardous for him politically.

National security adviser Mike Waltz, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and U.S. and Ukrainian delegates meet in Saudi Arabia on March 11, 2025.
Salah Malkawi/Getty Images

Conditions for a lasting peace

While the U.S.-Ukraine accord on a ceasefire has “put the ball” in Russia’s court, it is unclear whether it will be enough to bring Putin to the table. And even if it does, given past precedent it is difficult to see him arriving as a compromiser rather than a conqueror.

What does appear clear is that whatever “peace” emerges looks set to hang more on Ukraine making concessions and accepting losses.

Such a peace can be negotiated behind closed doors. But without public support in Ukraine, whether it endures on the ground is another matter.

Gerard Toal received funding from the US National Science Foundation to support research on public opinion in Ukraine.

John O’Loughlin receives current funding from the US National Science Foundation.

Kristin M. Bakke has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and the Research Council of Norway.